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This paper empirically investigates smoothing-out ratios and average 
holding periods of different Eurex futures such as the Euro-Bund, the 
DAX, the DJ Euro STOXX 50 future and others from 1999 to 2002. A 
methodology that only needs daily volume and open interest data is 
presented (including an innovative open interest correction algorithm). 
It can be shown that average holding periods decrease over time in most 
of the examined futures. Other interesting results are the June contract 
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The German options and futures exchange Eurex was founded as “Deutsche Terminbörse” 
(DTB) in the year 1990. Ever since, it has been growing in trading volume and importance. In 
1998 the DTB merged with the Swiss Soffex to form the Eurex. i Trading on Eurex is based on an 
efficient computer trading system, where different options and futures contracts have been and 
are still traded over time. ii Some futures (like e.g. the MDAX future) were not accepted by the 
market and thus cancelled after a few years. Some futures are among the world’s most heavily 
traded futures. In this paper we want to concentrate on futures that have already existed for a 
certain time and that have a relevant market impact, like the DAX or the Euro-Bund future (both 
traded since 1990) and others. iii  
 
It is a well-known fact that in futures markets there are different types of market participants. 
Usually speculators, hedgers and arbitrageurs are mentioned. Each of these participant groups 
has different motives and time horizons when trading. Many futures market studies are based on 
high quality data that distinguishes between different trader groups.iv In this survey another 
approach is pursued: We focus on the time horizon aspect and use daily open interest and volume 
data to calculate the average holding period. Averaging is done over all positions (short and 
long) held by all market participants. Comparing average holding period data of different 
contracts, one can draw conclusions about the presence of each of the different trader groups. 
 
The average holding period has already been considered by Canoles et al. (1998) for commodity 
futures, by Wiley and Daigler (1998) as a side aspect of volume relationships among different 
trader types and by Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998), (2002), who were the first to focus on the 
average holding period in an empirical examination of the DAX futures market. Comparative 
studies of several futures at the same exchange often consider open interest and  volume in 
relation to the volatility (like e.g. ap Gwilym et al. (2002)). In this survey, for the first time all 
important futures of one of the most active  futures exchanges are compared with respect to the 
average holding period and the smoothing-out ratio.  
 
The investigation period of this survey starts with the year 1999 where the Euro was introduced 
in Germany. All of the Eurex futures underwent regulatory changes due to this event, i.e. the 
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contracts were completely redefined.v We do not want to exp lore the time before Euro 
introduction, but rather focus on recent developments and the present time.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we explain the methodology 
that was used. Sections 3 and 4 display the data and the general results. Since the 09/11 terror 
attacks are covered by our examination window and since the Eurex was open during and after 
the terror attacks, we also explore the question whether there is a 09/11 effect or not. This is done 





In our study we use a method introduced by Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998) to measure average 
holding periods and smoothing-out ratios of several (historical) futures contracts. The method, 
which uses daily vo lume and open interest data, is modified to allow for regulatory changes at 
the Eurex, that have taken place since the method first was established. We also present a new 
error correction algorithm. In the following, we give a short description of the method. 
 
First, let us set up the basic notation. For the futures contract under consideration be 







∑  the (cumulated) trading volume up to day t 
tOI  the open interest in the future, i.e. the number of open short/long  positions at the 
end of day t. 
 
Time is measured in trading days. Trading starts at day 1 and ends at the settlement day T. We 
are not interested in an intraday analysis, but rather look upon the market at the end of each day.  
There is only one exception to this convention: the last trading day.  
 
Peculiarities on the last trading day 
On the settlement day the Eurex futures are not traded until the usual end of trading (in the 
evening hours). The trading stops when the settlement takes place. Thus we cannot count the last 
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day as a full trading day. With te we denote the amount of time (still measured in trading days) 
between the start of the future trading and the settlement. The time te is not an integer, but a 
fractional number somewhere between T-1 and T. The length of the interval ( -1; ]eT t is given by 
the number of trading hours on the last trading day divided by the number of trading hours on a 
usual day.  
 
The first thing of interest is the number of positions  (short or long) that are closed (or smoothed 
out) before the end of trading at time te in relation to the number of all short and long positions 
that have ever existed in the examined contract. 
 
Calculation of the smoothing-out ratio SOR 
























Note that the open interest at time te, which needs to be known to calculate the SOR, is not 
published by the Eurex. The published value for the last day is OIT (= 0). The estimation of the 
real value of 
et
OI  is treated in the next section.  
Even more important is the average holding period, for it averages all individual holding periods 
of short and long positions. Since we have to modify the formulae of Bamberg and Dorfleitner 
(1998) slightly, we will in the following give a short derivation of the formulae that are relevant 
for this paper. 
 
Calculation of the average holding period 
In order to calculate the average holding period, we look at the open interest over time function, 
where the open interest is multiplied with factor 2. This is done to meet the fact that the open 
interest is equal to the number of open short positions. Since we want to calculate the average 
holding period of all positions (short or long) and since there is one short and long pair behind 
each single open interest count, the factor 2 is needed to get the correct number.  
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At the end of each trading day the open interest is reported. First we consider a certain time 
interval (s,t]. Note that this is the time span from the end of day s, i.e. the beginning of day s+1, 




Open interest over time between s and t 
 
As a basic assumption (A1) for holding period assessment, we linearly interpolate the discrete 
function (cf. Figure 1). In reality the changes from one open interest value to the one of the next 
day will not exactly follow a linear function. But first, the actual intraday values will due to the 
structure of real futures markets never be assessable. And second, the relative OI changes from 
one day to another are relatively small, which implies a small error caused by this assumption. 
The assumption can thus be regarded as uncritical.  
 
We now consider all futures positions (short or long) that were open at any time during the 
interval (s,t], including all contracts that were open at time s or t. If the open interest at time s or t 
is not zero, we need the following additional assumption (A2): All positions that have been 
opened before time s or that have not been closed until time t have the same average holding 
period as the positions that remain completely within the interval.  
 
Now we can calculate the average holding period of all futures positions that were open during 
the interval (s,t] by dividing area Fst below the 2OI function by the cumulated trading volume of 
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Note that this formula is only valid under the above-mentioned assumptions A1 and A2. Several 
studies (like e.g. Wiley and Daigler (1998)) intuitively use the number of days until the open 
interest is completely turned over in terms of cumulated volume. The idea behind that is similar 
to formula (3), which is the exact answer to the average holding period question. 
 
The average holding period for the complete lifetime  of a contract 
To calculate the average holding period for the complete lifetime of a contract, we set 0=s  and 
ett = . The length of the interval from 1−T  until the settlement at time et  is denoted with x. 




Open interest over time (complete lifecycle of a contract) 
 
The open interest starts with a value of zero at time 0=t  and ends with a value of 
et
OI  at time 
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The value derived by formula (5) is the average holding period of all positions that have existed 
during the lifetime of the contract. 
 
Note that for the validity of formula (5) we only need the basic assumption (A1) of linearity 
between the discrete supporting points of the 2OI function. 
 
 
3 Data base and error correction 
 
Overview of the Eurex futures of the survey 
On the German derivative exchange many options and different futures contracts are traded. In 
our survey, we restrict to the seven most important ones.vii We consider the following index 
futures: 
• DAX Future (FDAX) 
• Dow Jones STOXX 50 Future (FSTX) 
• Dow Jones Euro STOXX 50 Future (FESX), 
the bond futures contracts  
• Euro-Bund future (FGBL) 
• Euro-Bobl future (FGBM) 
• Euro-Schatz future (FGBS) 
and the interest rate future 
• 3 months Euribor Future (FEU3).  
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The index futures FDAX, FSTX, FESX and the bond futures FGBL, FGBM, FGBS have a 
lifetime of nine months, with maturity in March, June, September, and December. Thus in every 
of these six futures products three contracts with different maturities are traded in parallel at any 
time. As usual, the nearest contract is the most liquid one. The three index futures refer to the 
indices with the same names, i.e. the German DAX (which is a performance index), the Dow 
Jones STOXX 50 and the Euro zone related Dow Jones Euro STOXX 50. Both latter indices are 
price indices. The contracts are settled in cash on the third Friday of the delivery month. One 
index point equals 25 Euro for the FDAX and 10 Euro for the FSTX and the FESX. 
 
The bond futures require physical delivery. The underlying of these futures is a virtual 100,000 
Euro German Federal Government national debt security with a coupon rate of 6% and with 
different years to maturity. The bond maturity is 8.5-10.5 years for the Euro-bund future 
(FGBL), 4.5-5.5 years for the Euro-Bobl future (FGBM) and 1.75-2.25 years for the Euro-Schatz 
future (FGBS). For the actual delivery, several real-world bonds are possible and certain 
conversions factors are applied. As will be seen below, almost 100% of all positions held in any 
of these futures are closed before settlement, so that physical delivery is almost irrelevant. At 
last, the FEU3 future refers to the three months Euro interbank offered rate (Euribor), the 
relevant Euro zone money market interest rate. There is also a one month Euribor future, but 
with almost no volume. Each FEU3 contract has a maturity of 36 months and is settled in cash. 
Delivery months are the same as with the other futures, implying that we have up to 12 contracts 
traded in parallel at any time.  
 
To draw conclusions with respect to market participants and their behaviour, these seven futures 
are now to be compared with respect to SOR and d. Since we do not want to consider the time 
before the EURO introduction, we restrict to contracts where the major trading activities and, of 
course, the settlement has taken place in 1999 or later. For all futures except the FDAX the 09/99 
contract is the first to consider. viii Our data set starts on 1998/12/21 for all futures (except the 
FDAX where it is the 1998/09/21). The first FDAX contract of our examination is the FDAX 
06/99 because we wanted to study the June contract phenomenon (the increased average holding 
period due to the concentration of dividend payments during May and June in Germany) and 
because there were no data errors. 
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As pointed out in the previous section, we need to know the length x of the trading interval on 
the settlement day in order to calculate the average holding period. Table I shows the trading 
times (in CET) and x values for the different contracts considered. 
 
TABLE I 
Trading hours of the examined futures contracts on usual days and on the last trading day 
 
 Period Trading time 
(Xetra) 
Trading on last 
trading day until 
x (length of 
interval [ -1; ]T te ) 
FDAX 98/09/21 to 99/09/17 08.30-17.00 13.00 9/17 
 99/09/20 to 00/06/02 09.00-17.30 13.00 8/17 
 as of 00/06/05 09.00-20.00 13.00 4/11 
     
FESX 98/12/21 to 02/12/28 09.00-17.30 12.00 6/17 
 as of 02/01/02 09.00-20.00 12.00 3/11 
     
FSTX 98/12/21 to 02/06/14 09.00-17.30 12.00 6/17 
 as of 02/06/17 09.00-20.00 12.00 3/11 
     
FGBL/FGBM/FGBS as of 98/12/21 08.00-19.00 12.30 9/21 
     
FEU 3 until 00/04/17 08.30-19.00 12.00 7/21 
 as of 00/04/18 08.30-19.00 11.00 5/21 
 
Both open interest and volume data are freely available, at least on a daily basis. But whereas the 
volume data are usually correct, the open interest data has to be prepared before usage.  
 
Open interest estimation on the settlement day 
The open interest is published at the end of day T-1 and at the end of T, where it is equal to zero. 
For our calculations we need the open interest at time te, though. Obviously, the value etOI  can 
not be far from OIT-1. The maximum distance is etV . To estimate the value of etOI  we use two 
alternative assumptions. Either  
• 100% of the trading volume 
et
V  of the last trading day or 
• 50% of the trading volume 
et
V  of the last trading day 
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are used for position closing. Of course the reality lies somewhere in between, but one has to 
make some plausible assumptions. As will be seen in the next section, the differences between 
the 50% and the 100% alternative are negligible in most cases. 
 
Open interest error correction algorithm 
It is known that reported open interest data are not completely reliable. This follows from the 
fact that sometimes position closings are mistakenly registered as openings of new positions and 
vice versa. Often the reported open interest is higher than the true open interest. ix Usually we can 
not recognize when an open interest error takes place. But sooner or later it gets adjusted by the 
exchange. Sometimes such adjustments are striking. If the OI change from day t-1 to day t is 
higher than the trading volume on day t, then this is a hint that a major OI error adjustment has 
taken place on day t.  
 
We now present an algorithm that performs a minimal error correction on the published OI data 
by eliminating values that can not be true. We call this procedure the logical correction. 
 
The algorithm moves from the end of trading backwards to the beginning. Two items are 
realistically assumed to be reliable: all volume data and the open interest on the last but one 
trading day T-1. With cOI we denote the corrected open interest data. The algorithm works step 
by step from t to 1−t .  
 
Be cOIt the logically corrected value. Now we examine the logical correctness of OIt-1. If |cOIt-
OIt-1|>Vt then there is a need for correction, since the change of the open interest from one day to 
the next can not be higher than the volume on the next day. 
Thus we set cOIt to that value closest to OIt-1 which does not anymore contradict Vt  and cOIt. 
The exact calculations are given below. Note that this kind of error correction does not lead to 
the true open interest values (which can not be reconstructed anymore), it just makes the reported 
value “less false”.  
 




1. Set -1 -1:T TcOI OI=  and t:=T-1 
2. Correction of 1t OI − : 
 a) if ( )-1 -1- - then :t t t t t tcOI OI V cOI cOI V< = +            
 b) if ( )-1 -1- then : -t t t t t tcOI OI V cOI cOI V> =             
 c) otherwise -1 -1:t tcOI OI=  (no correction) 
3. decrease t, if t=1 then stop, otherwise continue with 2.  
 




The following tables and figures show the results of the different futures. First we take a look at 
the FDAX (Table II). 
TABLE II 
Open interest error correction, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent DAX futures contracts 
 
FDAX         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
06/99  0 -576  14.1179 14.0709  0.8546 0.8482  3,101,028 
09/99  0 0  7.0647 7.0417  0.9487 0.9419  3,127,477 
12/99  2 0  6.1299 6.1015  0.9515 0.9417  3,316,290 
03/00  0 -220  6.4645 6.4376  0.8764 0.8680  3,603,567 
06/00  0 -12  17.3966 17.3596  0.7920 0.7881  2,819,230 
09/00  0 -961  9.4392 9.4071  0.9442 0.9373  2,153,438 
12/00  0 0  7.2021 7.1714  0.9571 0.9483  2,921,624 
03/01  4106 -128  7.5136 7.4798  0.9173 0.9082  2,987,987 
06/01  20349 -263  13.9430 13.9076  0.8847 0.8798  3,508,259 
09/01  0 0  4.9001 4.8765  0.9706 0.9604  4,175,454 
12/01  0 0  4.9207 4.9104  0.9707 0.9662  4,230,475 
03/02  378 -183  5.5207 5.5053  0.9591 0.9533  3,457,245 
06/02  86 -234  7.4641 7.4347  0.9549 0.9468  4,301,848 
09/02  255 0  4.5355 4.5202  0.9923 0.9849  5,743,846 
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The open interest error correction in Table II (and all following Tables) is defined basically on 
the difference cOI – OI summed up over all those days where the sign of the difference is 
positive resp. negative. A negative (positive) open interest error correction value thus means that 
there were days with a too high (low) reported open interest. 
 
We see that despite the effort of the Eurex to avoid open interest errors these errors still happen; 
some of them, for instance in the 06/01contract, are non-negligible. In relation to the total 
volume these errors are still not serious, though.  
 
With respect to the average holding period there is a clear trend over time towards smaller d 
values. The significance of this trend is examined below. At the same time we have seasonality 
in the average holding period data: the June contract phenomenon of about twice as high values 
(as first described by Bamberg and Dorfleitner (2002)) is still observable. It may be due to 
decreased dividend payments in 2002 or due to the general decreasing trend that the phenomenon 
has a smaller magnitude in the 06/02 contract. A very low d value can be observed at the 09/01 
and the 12/01 and the 09/02 contract. The first two facts may be due to the 09/11 terror attacks, 
an issue which we will discuss in the next section. The latter may again be a consequence of the 
trend towards decreasing d values, since the 09/02 contract is the newest contract of the survey. 
 
As already reported in Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998) there are high SOR values of about 90% 
to 100% (except in the June contracts). One can not observe a clear increase in parallel to the 
holding period decrease. 
 










Open interest error correction, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent DJ Euro STOXX 50 futures 
contracts  
 
FESX         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
09/99  163 0  20.8803 20.8247  0.9159 0.9107  1,389,842 
12/99  0 -1028  15.0392 14.9924  0.8880 0.8820  1,903,319 
03/00  862 -65  15.5900 15.5273  0.8657 0.8580  2,627,758 
06/00  1539 -1730  13.6988 13.6703  0.9359 0.9318  3,172,725 
09/00  0 -1183  18.9718 18.9262  0.8061 0.8017  3,118,334 
12/00  0 0  13.0039 12.9583  0.9370 0.9300  4,848,410 
03/01  6 -529  12.1176 12.0875  0.9115 0.9066  5,419,570 
06/01  0 -372  11.1207 11.0971  0.9257 0.9215  6,860,046 
09/01  749 -10  8.8901 8.8385  0.9493 0.9375  10,946,440 
12/01  0 -397  7.9327 7.9144  0.9521 0.9474  13,952,918 
03/02  0 -2875  9.1297 9.0986  0.9615 0.9546  12,189,529 
06/02  8923 -2453  7.8702 7.8463  0.9694 0.9632  15,929,007 
09/02  42 -3731  5.4057 5.3906  0.9872 0.9813  28,772,619 
 
With the FESX the open interest error corrections are negligible compared to the trading volume. 
At the same time we observe  
• a strong decrease in d and 
• a very strong increase in total volume (factor 20 from 09/99 to 09/02). 
 
Compared with the FDAX both changes over time are much stronger here. This contract 
obviously has attracted a lot of day traders over time. There is no such thing as the June contract 
phenomenon in this contract. The SOR values vary between about 80% and 99% with a slight 
tendency to increase. The FESX clearly is the most important stock index future at the Eurex.  
 
The reasons for this presumably are: 
• The FESX is more international than the FDAX. 
• Arbitrage in the FESX is easier than in the FSTX because of the unique currency in 
which the stocks belonging to the DJ Euro STOXX 50 index are traded. 
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• The Eurex co-operates with the GLOBEX and the CBOT, thus enabling traders around 
the world to trade EUREX futures. For these traders the FESX is the most important one 
as pointed out above. 
Table IV displays the results for the FSTX.  
 
TABLE IV 
Open interest error correction, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent DJ STOXX 50 futures 
contracts  
 
FSTX         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
09/99  0 -5769  28.6265 28.5370  0.7824 0.7767  67,219 
12/99  0 -10528  42.7168 42.6455  0.7919 0.7889  111,671 
03/00  3207 -1394  24.1805 24.0772  0.6527 0.6455  101,233 
06/00  474 -1377  27.7145 27.7050  0.8598 0.8591  94,455 
09/00  0 -1273  28.5834 28.4659  0.8585 0.8508  68,725 
12/00  0 -128  31.1058 30.9653  0.8463 0.8379  87,863 
03/01  0 0  29.6062 29.5584  0.7228 0.7200  77,147 
06/01  0 -208  29.6517 29.2854  0.8216 0.7988  81,153 
09/01  0 -2260  23.7659 23.6404  0.9450 0.9346  123,279 
12/01  0 -774  25.8819 25.7970  0.8347 0.8286  167,543 
03/02  0 -411  23.3854 23.2664  0.8954 0.8856  120,147 
06/02  0 -620  27.6573 27.5512  0.8523 0.8451  120,847 
09/02  0 -3  19.0925 18.9968  0.9503 0.9404  203,147 
 
Here, the open interest error correction in the 12/99 contract is so high that the corrected open 
interest value still may be too high, since the correction method is rather cautious. The d value of 
about 43 days presumably is too high.  
 
The FSTX has also increased in volume, but still the total volume is rather low. As mentioned 
above, the FSTX is dominated by the FESX. The SOR values are also lower which fits to the 
observation of rather large average holding periods.  
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Now we want to compare the three stock index futures with respect to the average holding 
period. The Figures 3 and 4 graphically show the d values with the 50% resp. the 100% 
assumption. In Figure 4 the FSTX future is missing, because measured in trading volume it is far 




















Average holding periods of several subsequent FDAX, FESX and FSTX contracts (50% assumption for the 
last trading day) 
 
It can be seen that the FSTX future has the largest holding periods whereas FDAX and FESX 
were far from each other in 1999 and 2000, but seemingly converge in 2002. In the 09/02 
contract the FDAX still has the shortest d value. The ques tion whether the differences are 











































Average holding periods of several subsequent FDAX, FESX contracts (100% assumption) 
 
Now we take a look at the FGB futures. Figure 5 shows the average holding periods of the three 
futures FGBL, FGBM and FGBS under the 100% assumption for the last trading day. Under the 





















Average holding periods of several subsequent FGBL, FGBM, FGBS contracts (100% assumption) 
 
The Tables V, VI and VII give the complete results. Again, we can see a certain decrease of the 
average holding period over time, but not as drastically as with the stock index futures. The 
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reason for this may be that these futures have a d value of about 2 to 4 trading days and that they 
have been very short-termed from the beginning.  
 
TABLE V 
Open interest error correction, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent Euro-Bund futures contracts 
 
FGBL         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
09/99  0 0  2.1382 2.1370  0.9951 0.9936  42,175,319 
12/99  0 -529  2.2278 2.2268  1.0000 0.9989  37,751,860 
03/00  0 -1019  2.1915 2.1901  0.9998 0.9982  36,034,936 
06/00  0 -19  2.1207 2.1195  0.9972 0.9958  41,488,680 
09/00  0 -45  2.2257 2.2241  1.0000 0.9982  35,343,296 
12/00  0 -165  2.5303 2.5280  0.9934 0.9913  35,897,417 
03/01  0 -169  1.9939 1.9927  0.9940 0.9925  42,187,256 
06/01  0 -255  1.9922 1.9909  0.9970 0.9952  44,068,182 
09/01  514 -34  1.9707 1.9694  0.9986 0.9970  40,508,476 
12/01  0 -1478  1.9447 1.9446  1.0000 0.9998  50,309,675 
03/02  0 -227  1.8212 1.8203  0.9947 0.9934  43,368,954 
06/02  0 -204  2.0120 2.0101  0.9998 0.9974  41,089,237 
09/02  0 -1488  1.9621 1.9611  1.0000 0.9987  53,119,354 
 
The results of the Euro-Bund future are remarkable. The increase of the trading volume and the 
decrease of d values are not as high as with the stock index futures. But the average holding 
periods are located around 2. Taking into account that this is an averaged value, a huge amount 
of day trading must take place in this future. The Euro-Bund future has been the most heavily 
traded derivative since 1999. Probably, but not surprisingly, it is also the one with the world’s 









Open interest error correction, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent Euro-Bobl futures contracts 
FGBM         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
09/99  0 -1780  2.8297 2.8266  0.9919 0.9893  16,216,909 
12/99  189 -35  2.7554 2.7540  0.9988 0.9976  16,185,525 
03/00  389 -527  3.0529 3.0501  0.9992 0.9971  15,395,322 
06/00  0 0  2.8220 2.8200  0.9989 0.9972  15,777,487 
09/00  0 -401  2.7671 2.7631  1.0001 0.9966  13,921,732 
12/00  0 -2827  3.1876 3.1810  0.9935 0.9887  15,821,906 
03/01  0 -1291  2.5309 2.5265  0.9888 0.9846  22,345,289 
06/01  0 -35  2.5787 2.5770  0.9959 0.9943  24,083,811 
09/01  0 -4505  2.6109 2.6087  0.9991 0.9971  21,201,979 
12/01  6000 -1123  2.5367 2.5356  1.0000 0.9989  30,694,013 
03/02  0 -5576  2.0638 2.0620  0.9993 0.9970  24,977,908 
06/02  0 -3050  2.5627 2.5602  0.9999 0.9975  25,631,003 
09/02  0 0  2.4732 2.4729  1.0000 0.9997  30,316,276 
 
TABLE VII 
Open interest error correction, d, SOR  and total volume for several subsequent Euro-Schatz futures contracts 
FGBS         
  OI error corr.  d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
09/99  0 -2910  3.2707 3.2650  0.9862 0.9822  6,132,144 
12/99  0 0  4.0122 4.0096  0.9986 0.9971  7,224,159 
03/00  0 0  4.3769 4.3667  0.9930 0.9878  7,752,011 
06/00  0 -1470  3.5611 3.5573  0.9974 0.9950  10,491,203 
09/00  0 0  3.5376 3.5332  0.9963 0.9935  10,402,757 
12/00  0 -100  3.9919 3.9852  0.9940 0.9903  12,242,084 
03/01  0 -877  3.0154 3.0134  1.0000 0.9984  17,687,494 
06/01  0 -1244  3.1841 3.1817  0.9910 0.9892  22,190,142 
09/01  0 -2108  3.9871 3.9857  1.0000 0.9992  19,701,202 
12/01  0 -969  3.2866 3.2839  1.0000 0.9981  30,006,885 
03/02  0 -1228  2.7830 2.7830  1.0000 1.0000  24,777,971 
06/02  0 -4330  2.9750 2.9717  0.9999 0.9973  24,727,497 
09/02  0 -1703  2.3388 2.3385  1.0000 0.9997  30,029,440 
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The very high SOR numbers close to 100% in all three bond futures are not so much a 
consequence of average holding period but rather of the complicated delivery regulations. 
Almost all market participants (even hedgers) avoid this effort by smoothing out their positions 
before settlement. In the FGBM and the FGBS we also can observe a strong increase in volume. 
Still the FGBL is the most important future, but his two “younger brothers” have also gathered 
more importance. Again, this may be a consequence of the Eurex co-operations with other 
exchanges. 
 
Finally, we consider the Euribor future, a product in the shadow of the FGB contracts (Table 
VIII, Figure 6). From the SOR and d values it is most similar to the FSTX future. But, here the 
total volume is decreasing.  
 
TABLE VIII 
Open interest error, d, SOR and total volume for several subsequent 3 months Euribor futures contracts 
 
FEU3          
   OI error   d  SOR  Total volume  
Contract maturity  positive negative  100% 50%  100% 50%   
06/99 9 months  0 -91  16.8056 16.8035  0.8159 0.8157  497,268 
03/00 18 months  0 -340  21.4256 21.4239  0.8691 0.8690  739,457 
06/00 21 months  0 -1181  19.4153 19.4122  0.8962 0.8959  550,908 
09/00 24 months  0 -3520  23.0074 23.0072  0.9084 0.9084  442,785 
12/00 27 months  0 -3273  27.9047 27.8975  0.9118 0.9113  284,815 
03/01 30 months  104 -1126  23.5556 23.5556  0.8552 0.8552  267,645 
06/01 33 months  0 -1922  22.3058 22.2600  0.8609 0.8570  224,859 
09/01 3 years  0 -629  20.8019 20.7492  0.9161 0.9112  168,506 
12/01 3 years  0 -668  21.7161 21.7086  0.8836 0.8829  137,702 
03/02 3 years  0 -381  24.0697 24.0697  0.8710 0.8710  108,601 
06/02 3 years  0 -396  27.2320 27.0118  0.8735 0.8582  113,777 
















Average holding periods of several subsequent FEU3 futures (100% assumption) 
 
The question arises whether or not the differences between different futures are significant. We 
apply a Wilcoxon rank test to answer this question. Table IX shows the hypotheses and the 
results of the test. The test statistic i
n
i




 is based on the differences Di that 











Hypotheses and test results for the average holding period differences between several futures 
 
H0 H1 W+ 
  100% 50% 
E(dFDAX)=E(dFESX) E(dFDAX)<E(dFESX) 3* 3* 
E(dFESX)=E(dFSTX) E(dFESX)<E(dFSTX) 0* 0* 
    
E(dFGBL)=E(d FGBM) E(dFGBL)<E(dFGBM) 0* 0* 
E(dFGBM)=E(dFGBS) E(dFGBM)<E(dFGBS) 1* 1* 
                                                                                     * significant at a 0.5% level 
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Obviously, all differences are highly significant. Another question of interest is the significance 
of the above-mentioned trends in the average holding period time series.  
 
Table X shows the slope resulting from linearly regressing the average holding period (100% 
data) on time. This regression is done for each of the futures. The next column shows the t value 
of the slope coefficient under the normal distribution assumption. The last column shows the 
results of a non-parametric trend analysis based on Spearman’s correlation coefficient.  
 
TABLE X 
Significance of trends in the average holding periods over time for the considered futures 
 
Future s lope t value Spearman’s correlation coefficient  
FDAX -0,4069 -1,6350 -0,4813* 
FESX -1,0653 -7,3806** -0,9451** 
FSTX -0,8366 -2,4044* -0,5934** 
FGBL -0,0285 -2,5772* -0,7527** 
FGBM -0,0486 -3,0206** -0,7802** 
FGBS -0,0983 -2,9498** -0,6978** 
FEU3 0,3559 1,4497 0,3636 
* (**) represents significance on the 5% (1%) level 
 
As can be seen, the positive trend in the FEU3 is not significant, whereas all negative trends in 
the FGB futures and the FESX and ESTX are highly significant. The negative trend in the FDAX 
has a little less significance, which presumably is due to the seasonal pattern resulting from the 
June contract phenomenon. Summarizing, we state that the trends towards shorter average 





5 September 11 and the average holding period 
 
As we have seen in the previous section there seems to be a lot of trading activity in some of the 
contracts that were nearby contracts on 2001/09/11. Since the Eurex was open during and after 
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the terror attacks of that day, the question whether there is a 09/11 effect or not seems very 
interesting. In this section we want to find out whether or not the average holding period changed 
after the terror attacks. To do this we need to split up the whole lifetime of a contract into two 
parts, the time until 09/10 and the time from 09/11 until the end of the contract. For each of these 
two periods we want to determine separately the average holding period. This can be done by 
modifying resp. applying formulae (3) and (5). 
 
Period until 2001/09/10 
To measure the average holding period within this period, we apply formula (3) with 0=s . 
























Here t is equal to 2001/09/10. Note that the assumptions A1 and A2 are necessary for this 
formula. 
 
Period from 2001/09/11 until settlement 
To calculate the holding period of this small time window, we modify formula (5). Figure 7 




Open interest over time between s and the end of trading 
The area is: 
T-1          s 
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We set s = 2001/09/11. 
 
Results  
For the FDAX, FESX (we leave out the FSTX) the 09/01 contract was nearby on 2001/09/11. 
Including that day, there were 9 trading days left to maturity. For all contracts we now calculate  
[ ]0; 10−Td  the average holding period up to the T-10 trading day 
( 10; ]eT t
d −  the average holding period for the last 9 days. 
 
In the 09/01 contract we possibly can observe a 09/11 phenomenon. The other contracts values 
create the necessary benchmark. 
 
The Tables XI and XII show the results for the FESX and the FDAX.  
 
TABLE XI 
Average holding period and total volume of the FESX for the time before and after 09/11  
 
























09/00 23.6061 7.3923 0.3132 2,462,463 655,871 
12/00 15.1781 5.4919 0.3618 3,872,803 975,607 
03/01 14.6427 4.9802 0.3401 4,181,738 1,237,832 
06/01 12.6095 5.4766 0.4343 5,626,487 1,233,559 
09/01 10.9066 3.7441 0.3433 8,036,866 2,909,574 




Average holding period and total volume of the FDAX for the time before and after 09/11  
 
























09/00 10.7836 4.5016 0.4175 1,735,748 417,690 
12/00 7.7650 4.5454 0.5854 2,445,601 476,023 
03/01 8.5980 4.0332 0.4691 2,363,817 624,170 
06/01 15.5308 7.1723 0.4618 3,007,146 501,113 
09/01 5.5468 2.5679 0.4630 3,300,622 874,832 
12/01 5.1179 3.5036 0.6846 3,748,736 481,459 
 
In both contracts there was a clear increase in volume and a clear decrease of the average holding 
period in the 9 days after the 09/11 terror attacks. But the decrease in the FDAX started already 








shows that the 09/11 decrease was nothing striking in the 
FDAX. The highest values can be observed in the 12/01 contracts. Again this surely is due to 
09/11, which lies in the first half of these contracts lifetime.  
 
The Euro-Bund future 09/01 is not affected by a possible 09/11 phenomenon since trading in this 
contract stopped on 2001/09/06. Thus the 12/01 contract is the one to be examined with respect 
to 09/11. In this contract, the day before 2001/09/11 is 64 trading days away from the end of 
trading. Table XIII shows the results.  
TABLE XIII 
Average holding period and total volume of the FGBL for the time before and after 09/11  
 
























09/00 3.4313 2.0952 0.6106 3,406,659 31,936,637 
12/00 3.1698 2.4727 0.7801 2,822,207 33,074,510 
03/01 3.5026 1.9244 0.5494 1,794,383 39,031,222 
06/01 5.1469 1.8348 0.3565 2,076,226 41,991,956 
09/01 3.0336 1.9046 0.6278 2,796,556 37,711,920 
12/01 2.2036 1.9219 0.8721 4,041,893 46,267,782 
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Here we have a high total volume, but at the same time the highest ratio of pre and after 09/11 
average holding periods. This also can be 09/11 effect, but in the opposite direction of the stock 
index futures. Locally the holding period increased, a hint that maybe more hedgers than usually 





Summarizing the findings of the survey, we state: 
• The Eurex gives home to some futures (namely the FDAX, the FGBL, the FGBM, and 
the FGBS) which reveal very short-termed trading behavior of market participants. This 
means that possibly there are huge masses of day traders in these futures. The FGBL with 
less than 2 days of average holding period at the end of our investigation period is the one 
with the most short-termed behavior of the market participants. 
• Within our investigation period we could observe a tendency to even more short-term 
behavior in all futures (except the FEU3). This tendency cannot be regarded as a stable 
trend to predict future developments, of course, since the average holding period cannot 
become lower than zero. But nevertheless it is highly significant. 
• Looking at the stock index futures we have seen, that the FDAX is the “most short-
termed” one, but FESX came close at the end of our investigation period. In terms of 
trading volume the FESX is the most important one whereas the FSTX is close to 
meaninglessness. 
• There are hints for a local 09/11 effect of smaller resp. higher average holding periods in 
the FDAX and FESX resp. FGBL. This effect is superimposed by the general trend 
towards shorter holding periods. 
 
The methodology we presented in this paper uses only publicly available data, but still is very 
helpful at the same time. It can be applied to many futures at many exchanges. A suggestion for 
further research with this methodology is to examine all of the world’s most important futures 
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i  The Eurex still consists of two separately managed divisions, the Eurex Germany and the Eurex Switzerland 
ii See Eurex (2002).  
iii Bühler and Kempf (1994), Kempf (1998) and Bamberg and Dorfleitner (2002) are contributions which focus on 
the DAX future. Ahn et al. (2002) examine the determinants of price moves in the bund future. 
iv Daigler and Wiley (1999), Wang (2002), (2003) are recent examples of such studies. 
v See Deutsche Börse (1998) in this regard. 
vi The formula is derived in Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998). 
vii We leave out the Swiss Market products like  the SMI and the CONF future and recent innovations like the 
EONIA future. 
viii  The reason for this restriction is data problems with most of the futures. Presumably these problems are due to the 
Euro introduction. 
ix In Bamberg and Dorfleitner (1998) only this case occurs. 
